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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALLIED MATERIALS COMPANY, 
et al., 
Defendants and Appellants 
vs. 
SALT LAKE, GARFIELD & WEST-
ERN RAILWAY CO. 
Plaintiff and Respond,ent 
Case No. 8372 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this case are undisputed. 
i>laintiff and its predecessors in title operate a rail-
road on trackage extending west from the city limits 
of Halt Lake City. In 1897, Plaintiff's predecessor in-
stituted condemnation proceedings to increase the width 
of its right-of-way 'by 33~ feet for a length of 89,9.25 
feet. By :a decree dated December 6, 1897, the District 
Court condemned this land and awarded it to the railroad. 
Such decree was not recorded by the Railroad in the 
office of the Oounty Recorder as required by law, (Title 
78-3'4-15 UCA 1953 - Comp. Laws of Utah 1888, 
§'3856) until November 6, 1952, almost 55 years later, 
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and not until after Defendant Allied had purchased its 
iand. [Exhibit 2, p. 68-70.] 
On August 9, 1909, two deeds were executed by cer-
tain predecessors in title to Defendants (Exhibit 2, p. 23 
and 24) covering a large piece of property in sections 3 
and 34, and including the property now owned by Defend-
ants. One deed contained, after the legal description of 
the properties in both sections, this recitation : 
'' * ·if: * Less that portion of said land awarded to 
the 8altair Beach Railroad Company for right-
of-way and also less that portion of said land 
deeded to the Western Pacific Railway Com-
pany.'' 
The other contained a similar provision. Subsequently, 
the portion of the land covered by these deeds was brok-
en up into many smaller portions. No subsequent con-
veyance in Defendant's chain of title refers to this decree. 
(Exhibit 2) Plaintiffs claim that this recitation made by 
a stranger placed Defendants on constructive notice of 
Plaintiffs right under the decree of 1897. 
Plaintiff or its predecessor at some undetennined 
time had erected a single track line along its right-of-
way ~and had placed pole lines on each side of this track 
holding up overhead electric wires. (R. p. 14) The pole 
lines cross property which is both outside and inside 
the claimed right-of-way of Plaintiff (e.g. Plaintiff has 
never taken any steps to acquire, either judicially or by 
conveyance, the property over which its poles run directly 
east of Defendant's land.) (R. p. 45) The poles of Plain-
tiff are 8 or 9 feet within the boundary 'aS set forth in 
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the legal description of Defendant's property. (R. p. 
54-55) The sole objects ever placed by Plaintiff on the 
property in dispute are the poles and guy and trolley 
wires. Plaintiff claims that the physical presence of 
these objects gave Defendants constructive notice of the 
claimed fee simple interest of Plaintiff under the decree 
of 1897. 
On June 4, 19·51, Defendant, Allied Materials Com-
pany acquired a piece of property 200 feet wide for a 
valuable consideration. (Exhibit 2, p. 67) The deed des-
cription designated a lot of depth of 660 feet, which was 
the depth of the lot prior to the 1897 condemnation 
award, and it therefore conflicted with the railroad's 
claim. This depth has been used in all descriptions since 
1897. Defendant Allied had no actual knowledge of any 
claimed interest of the railroad to the property. It had 
had an abstract prepared and examined, and had had 
the property surveyed. Defendant Allied subsequently 
constructed a fence along the pole line and stored mater-
ials within the enclosure. Shortly thereafter, the rail-
road made demand upon defendants to remove the fence, 
and on November 6, 1952, recorded the decree of 1897. 
(Exhibit 2, p. 68) On October 30, 1953, Allied conveyed 
the property by the same description to defendant 
Ketchum Builders Supply Company. (Exhibit 2, p. 72) 
Plaintiff filed an action praying that title be quieted in 
it on the basis of its unrecorded decree, and that Defend-
ants be ejected from such property. (R. p. 1-3). Defend-
ant's answered claiming among other things, that they 
') 
o) 
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were purchasers for value in good faith without notice. 
(R. p. 4-7C) 
On the basis of these facts, the trial Court, sitting 
without a jury, held that defendants had purchased the 
property with constructive notice of the interest of the 
railroad, such notice being given both by the record and 
by the physical facts. Defendants appeal from both 
findings as to notice. (R. p. 64) There being no dispute 
as to the facts, Defendants ask this Court to hold that 
as a matter of law these facts do not justify a finding of 
constructive notice. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DE-
FENDANTS HAD CONSTRUCTIVE RECORD NOTICE OF 
THE DECREE OF 1897. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
USE OF THE PROPERTY MADE BY PLAINTIFF GAVE 
DEFENDANTS CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMED FEE INTEREST. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INCLUDING FIND-
INGS UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
A. THE DECREE INCLUDES LAND NOT CLAIMED 
BY DEFENDANTS, BUT BY THIRD PARTIES. 
B. THERE IS NO PROBATIVE EVIDENCE OF THE 
PAYMENT OF TAXES BY PLAINTIFF OVER THE DIS-
PUTED LAND. 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendants believe the problem here transcends 
ownership of a 33ya foot strip of land. It involves the 
setting of a standard o.f care in title examination which 
has great significance to all purchasers and the legal 
profession as a whole. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE REC-
ORD NOTICE OF THE DECREE OF 1897. 
The railroad did not record i'ts decree with the 
county recorder prior to the purchase of the property 
by defendants, and defendants had no actual knowledge 
of the railroad's alleged interest. Defendants, there-
fore, claim to be purchasers in good faith for value 
without notice of such decree, (Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, ~ 57-3-3). The railroad claims that defendants had 
not actual, but constructive notice of their claimed in-
terest, both by the record and by the physical facts. In 
urging the existence of constructive record notice, the 
railroad must rely upon the recitation in third party's 
deed of 1909, which was recorded. 
What is the basis for constructive record notice? 
Pomeroy has stated: 
Such notice must '' ...... find its ultimate found-
ation and only support in motives of policy and 
expediency." 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 
4th Ed. ( 19'18) p. 1364. 
rrhe question of constructive record notice should he con-
sidered in the light of our recording statutes and the 
avowed policies behind them. 
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Such statutes incorporate within the1nselves the con-
cept of estoppel. 
"Registry statutes are legislative extensions of 
the doctrine of estoppel. They forbid those who 
have, and yet withhold fron1 the record, their 
muniments of title, from asserting the title these 
muniments disclose against others who have in-
nocently purchased the land from him who ap-
pears by the record to be the owner while the 
holders of the real title silently conceal it. They 
rest upon and enforce the equitable proposition 
that he who knowingly conceals his ownership 
when he ought to disclose it shall not assert it to 
the detriment of his neighbor who has acted in 
reliance upon his silence." Boynton vs. l-Ia.gg~art, 
(1903, CCA 8) 120 Fed. 819, at 823. 
In the light of this policy, the author of a lead-
ing article on this question has stated that the burden 
of proof of such notice should be placed upon the negli-
gent non-recorder. 
A "means of attaining [the desired end of such 
recording statutes] would be by providing for the 
divestment of an unrecorded title in favor of a 
subsequent purchaser, who should therefore, as 
respects all matters of substance and procedure, 
be treated as the deliberately appointed favorite 
of the statute; (3) that to the utmost possible 
extent such purchaser should be protected in rely-
ing upon the record, and the burden of proof in 
litigation between him and the negligent non-
recorder of the prior deed should invariably be 
upon the latter .... " 
Philbrick, Limits of Record Search, and There-
fore of Notice, 9·3 U. of Pa. Law Review, 125 at 
p. 127 
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"Notice is an equity doctrine. As such it must 
rest on fairness and reasonableness. As respects 
whom~ Manifestly, the subsequent purchaser." 
Philbrick, Ibid, p. 132. 
''If, in dealing with the recording problem, the 
party to be favored is the subsequent purchaser, 
certain ineluctable conclusions follow. One is 
that the courts should constantly and consistently 
put the burden of proving notice on the prior 
Grantee, both in inquiry notice and in doubtful 
cases of record notice. Another conclusion is that 
such purchaser should not be defeated by a doc-
trine of notic,e t.hat is unreasonable in the burden 
it puts on him; and this either as respects to re-
quirement of an unreasonable search of the rec-
ord, or as respects what puts him on inquiry, or 
as respects the nature or extent of the inquiry to 
be made." (emphasis added) 
Philbrick, Ibid, page 155. 
r:ehis burden is not met by vague or ambiguous record 
recitation. 
"Nobody would question the statement that re-
citals in deeds in a purchaser's chain of title bar 
bona fides only when the matter referred to, 
when incorporated into the reciting deed, reveals 
the hostile and superior right with reasonable cer-
tainty. Vague or ambiguous records give no 
notice * * * It is not enough to confront him [the 
purchaser] with a legal problem, a solution of 
which by a court perhaps few could predict." 
Philbrick, Ibid, p. 271. 
Indeed, as one standard text has stated: 
"The power of one who records an instrument to 
impose upon third persons dealing with the prop-
erty the duty of searching elsewhere for matters 
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pertinent to the instrument recorded is, and 
clearly ought to be, a rather lin1ited one." 
82 A.L.R. p. 412. 
This court has repeatedly held that constructive 
notice will be determined by the use of the test of the 
"reasonably prudent man," 0' Reilly v. M cLewn, 84 
Utah 551, 37 P. 2d 770, (1934); LeVine v. Whitehouse, 
37 Utah 228, 109 P. 2d (1910). 
The above considerations should be kept in mind 
in any determination of what is reasonable and prudent. 
The deed of 1909 covered an area much larger than 
that now claimed by defendants. At the end of the des-
cription covering this much larger piece of property, it 
is stated: 
''less that portion of said land awarded to the 
Saltair Beach Railroad Company for right of 
way, and also less that part of the land deeded to 
the Western Pacific Railroad Company." 
Such reference is clearly both vague and ambiguous. 
It does not outline the parties to the action, nor does it 
set forth the property covered by the decree referred 
to. A purchaser is not notified merely by suspicious or 
speculative inferences. U.S. v. Routt County Coal Co. 
(1918, CCA8), 248 F. 4!85. The court in this case·, in 
disregarding arguments as to alleged constructive notice, 
said, "the fact ... is as susceptible of an innocent ex-
planation as a fraudulent one." 
It is appellant's contention that the existence of a 
reasonable ground for disreg,arding a recitation which 
might refer to a conflicting property reference is enough 
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r· 
tee·:-
to destroy any constructive notice which might otherwise 
be implied. In the case of a negligent non-recorder, the 
rule is not what one might have discovered, but only what 
one had no reasonable excuse for not discovering. 
In the instant case there are two convincing reasons 
why a person could reasonably assume that the reference 
could be disregarded. 
rrhe land covered by the 1909 deed was a large parcel 
on each side of the railroad tracks. This large parcel 
was gradually divided and conveyed in smaller bits. The 
abstract of the defendants, of course, contains only those 
instruments which included defendant's land. As these 
parcels got smaller, references to the decree disappeared. 
This could quite reasonably lead a title examiner to the 
conclusion that such reservation in the 1909 deed re-
ferred to property not corvered by the abstractor's certi-
ficate, which was therefore, omitted as no longer rele-
vant. Thus, for example, the decree might well have 
affected land to the west of the defendants' property, 
in which event, it would not have appeared in defend-
ants' abstract even if it had been of record. 
~lore concretely, the 1909 deeds conveyed property 
in Section 34 (including the disputed property) and in 
Section 3, immediately to the south of this land. It is 
not clear which parcel the exception clause refers to. 
As the Western Pacific Railway tracks run through 
Section 3 (Exhibit 1) it must be assumed that the reci-
tation "less that portion of said land deeded to the West-
ern Pacific Railway Company" refers to this property 
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alone. (The fact that defendants' abstract does not con-
tain this deed is perfectly consistent with the analysis, 
because it is irrelevant to defendants if it does not deal 
with their property). Is it not reasonable to asswne that 
the reservation as to the Saltair Beach Railroad applied 
to the Section 3 land as well~ Section 3 also abutted the 
Saltair trackage. This analysis is confirmed by a sub-
sequent deed of both the Section 34 and Section 3 prop-
erties (abstract, Exhibit 2, Page 49) where the parcels 
are clearly divided, the property being described as fol-
lows: 
1. Commencing at the Southwest corner of 
the Southeast 1,4 of Section 34, Township 1 North, 
Range 1 West, 'Salt Lake Meridian, running thence 
East 54_0 rods; thence North 40 rods ; thence 
West 54_0 rods; thence South 40 rods to the be-
ginning. 
2. All of Lot 2, Section 3, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 West, of Salt Lake Meridian, less rail-
road and streets. 
The reservation "less railroads and streets" obviously 
applies only to the Section 3 land. 
A second reason why a reasonable man would not 
pay attention to the 1909 deed is the fact that the Utah 
law requires and did require at the time of the 1897 
decree that in the case of a condemnation award "A 
copy of the judgment must be filed in the office of the 
Recorder of the County, and thereupon the property des-
cribed therein shall vest in the plaintiff for the purpose 
therein specified." (Title 78-34-15, UCA, 1953; 2 Comp. 
Laws of Utah 1888 §38'56). (Emphasis added.) 
10 
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One can properly assume that the law has been 
complied with and that such a decree was recorded. It 
the decree had been recorded as required by law and it 
did not cover defendant's land, it would not, of course, 
have appeared in defendants' abstract ·and there would 
be no reason for further inquiry as to any reference to 
it. In the light of the statutory requirements and the 
~~~- absence of such a decree in the instant abstract, defend-
ants can quite properly assume this to have been the 
:1it· case. 
[:~ 
,, 
~ lj ' 
Plaintiff, by failing to comply with a law making 
mandatory the recordation of its decree, held, because 
of its own act, no claim of record to the disputed prop-
erty. The existence of the statutory duty of record and 
a presumed compliance therewith is certainly a suffic-
ient reason to discount vague and to defendants, ambig-
uous recitations by third parties as to plaintiff's claim. 
True enough, defendant could conceivably, operat-
ing on some premonition, have gone to the Clerk of the 
District Court and run the index to the parties litigant 
to determine all cases in which the railroad's predeces-
sor was a party prior to August 9, 1909, to procure the 
files of such actions, and to search them for property 
covered by the legal description in defendants' deed, but 
to torture such conduct into that of a reasonably prudent 
man is to pervert the function of the recording statutes. 
Such a requirement is to twist the law from placing the 
burden of giving notice upon the negligent non-recorder 
to requiring arduous research from the innocent pur-
chaser. 
11 
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Even when apprised of the existence of such a 
decree the record shows that it took six n1an hours· by 
trained abstractors to find the document in question. 
(R. p. 42) Sueh pains cannot be required of the reason-
ably prudent man. 
This is a practical world. Attorneys who examine 
abstracts are practical men. In expecting them to certify 
to the state of a title, certainly some limits must be 
placed on the search which is required of them. To force 
the title examiner to arduously trace down every pos-
sible conflict, even when good reasons exist for com-
pletely disregarding it, would make the duties of and 
responsibility for abstract examination something that 
only attorneys with unlimited time, or large title insur-
ance companies with their comprehensive physical facili-
ties, could assume. 
In assuming what is "reasonable," is it not relevant 
that in all of the various transactions since 1909 the 
legal desc-ription has never been modified? The depth 
used has always been 660 feet, which conflicts with plain-
tiff's claim. One can only assume that title examination 
even at that time placed no one on sufficient notice of 
plaintiff's claim to modify the legal description. Each 
previous party has boldly warranted this full description. 
One of the most convincing tests of reasonableness is 
surely the action taken by others faced with the identical 
problem. 
The law must never stray too far from what a lay-
Inan calls "common sense" for it is upon this that the 
1:.2 
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~~ 
great strength of the common law is buttressed. "Con-
structive" notice is a legal fiction. Its sole justification 
is a belief that no reasonable man would have acted other-
wise. To protect the railroad's negligence of 50 years 
by a vague reference placed of record by a third party 
does not, it is submitted, come within this concept. It is, 
therefore, submitted that the T·rial Court erred in find-
ing that appellants were placed on -constructive notice 
of the railroad's interest. 
~m- POINT II 
!!~ THERE IS NO POSSESSION OF PLAINTIFF OVER THE 
~i DISPUTED LAND WHICH GIVES CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE 
OF A CLAIMED FEE INTEREST. 
uj. The Trial Court has further found that the physical 
facts gave the appellants notice of the railroad's claimed 
fee interest. The only physical facts that could lead to 
this could be (a) the proximity of the railroad tracks to 
the disputed property, although not upon it, or (b) the 
existence of poles, and guy and trolley wires upon the 
disputed property. 
As to the presence of the trackage, questions of this 
nature generally arose at the turn of the century when 
railroads were acquiring or expanding their rights-of-
way. Two decisions of that period quite clearly point 
out that adjoining owners to railroad property were 
charged with notice of the railroad's ownership only to 
the extent of actual use. In Va.rwig vs. Cleveland CO. & 
St. L. Railro1ad Company, 44 NE. 92, (1896) the Supreme 
Court of Ohio said : 
13 
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''And this is carrying the doctrine of presumptiot 
far enough. In no aspect of the case could he be 
found to assume that the company had acquired 
the right· to lay additional track. Had the com-
pany placed its release on record at the proper 
time, that, under the statute, would have been 
notice. Having chosen to keep it off the record 
for more than six months, and until after its 
Grantors sold to a bona fide purchaser, that com-
pany cannot now he heard to assert that the title 
of that purchaser is impaired by its unrecorded 
release. The statute but adopts the principal of 
equity which holds that he in consequence of 
whose negligence a fraud has been committed 
shall sustain any resulting loss, and the rule is 
just, wise and salutary." p. 95 
In the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Rwil-
wa;y Compamy vs. Welch, (Neb.) 118 NW 1116, (1908), a 
railroad acquired a strip of land in 1890 which was 100 
feet north and 200 feet south of the center of its tracks. 
It did not record the document showing acquisition of 
this property until 1904. In the meantime, a plat was 
recorded by a municipality in 1891 which overlapped 
with the property acquired by the railroad. The town 
sold this property to the defendant in 189'1. The defend-
ant recorded his deed in the same year and built upon 
the property. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held the 
defendant to be a bona fide purchaser and held that the 
admission that the railroad had opera ted the track since 
before the date of defendant's acquisition was not notice 
14 
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:~wl· 
at~ 
to the world of the limits of its grant. In a companion 
case, Chicago, Rock Lslarnd arnd Pacific Railway Com-
pany vs. Welch, (Neb.) 118 NW 1117, the court held that 
the recitation in a previous contract that land was "sub-
ject, however, to the easement of said railroad in its 
right-of-way" was still not enough to impart constructive 
notice. 
vVould the existence of poles some eight feet within 
the disputed property give any additional notice of a 
fee interest 1 
Merrill, in his work on notice has stated: 
"[Possession] 'is sometimes notice of the real 
right and title of the possessor, and sometimes 
not,' depewdant upon the extent to which the par-
ticular po.ssession seems inconsistent with the 
apparent. title. It is to be used 'not blindly but 
according to the surrounding circumstances 
affecting the rationale of the doctrine of notice.' 
Ordinarily the administration of the rules is in 
the hands of the court, where the evidence is un-
disputed, ***Since the sole office of possession 
is to arouse inquiry, it has no effect in determin-
ing the nature of the search nor where it should 
be made ... It is a common statement that an 
equivocal possession will not suffice as a source 
of inquiry." 1 Merrill on Notice, Section 102, p. 
125-127. (Emphasis added.) 
Defendants concede that the existence of poles upon 
property gives notice of an alleged pole line easement 
because that particular possession is inconsistent with 
Defendant's apparent title to this extent. But this is a8 
far as such notice goes. There is nothing inconsistent 
with the existence of a non-record pole line easement and 
15 
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an owner's title. If the existence of a pole line were 
notice of a claimed fee interest of an even greater area 
every title examiner of Salt Lake residential property 
would have to include a trip to the Utah Power and Light 
Company as a standard part of his title procedure. 
Obviously, this is not the case. Utah hmne owners have 
safely assumed such non-record pole lines to be sup-
ported only by easements. 
Physical possession is notice of a claimed interest of 
a nature necessary to support the type of possession in 
question. Overhanging eaves are not notice of a claimed 
fee interest. A five story building is notice of more than 
a mere easement. 
The problems of any other analysis are obvious. 
Assuming arguendo that a pole line is notice of a claimed 
fee interest, what is the extent of the land so claimed~ 
The few feet on which the poles rests~ The strip 20 feet 
wide~ 30 feet wide~ Is one pole placed in a corner of 
a large tract notice of a claimed fee interest in the entire 
property~ Obviously not. 
The problem might be approached by asking what 
sort of prescriptive right could the railroad get by main-
taining such pole line and wires for the required statu-
tory period. (e.g. What interest has the railroad acquired 
in the property to the east of appellant, where they have 
never condemned the property and over which their 
pole line now runs). Can there be any doubt that a pole 
line obtains nothing more than a prescriptive easement, 
entitling its owner only to enter upon the property for 
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the reasonable maintenance and repair of said poles~ 
One of the principal characteristics of an easement 
is the absence of all rights to participate in the profits 
of the soil charged with it. As a standard text has 
stated in giving examples of such an interest: 
''For example, the right of an owner of an estate 
to erect and maintain, or cause to be erected and 
maintained, for his own benefit, a line of tele-
graph poles over the estate of another is held to 
constitute an easement." 17 Am. Jur. p. 924, 
Easements, Section 2. (emphasis added) 
In discussing what forms of physical user give notice 
of a claimed easement which may be discovered by rea-
sonable inspection, the same text states : 
"Examples of apparent easements include canals 
and ditches, chimney flues, ferry landings, light 
and air, pipes, poles and wires, private ways, 
privies, supports of encroaching structures and 
water rights." 17 Am. Jur. p. 1019, Easements, 
Section 130. (emphasis added) 
Other cases have held pole lines to be notice of mere 
easements. New York, New Haven and Hartford Rail-
road Company vs. Russell, (1910 Conn.) 78 A 324; In-
dianapolis and C. Traction Compatny v. Arlington Teleph. 
Co., (1911 Ind.), 95 NE 280. 
Respondent railroad has never fenced the property 
in question (despite the requirement in the decree of con-
demnation that this be done). It has, at most exerted an 
easement interest. 
Certainly there is no evidence of acts of "unequivocal 
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character indicating a claim of ownership." Day vs. 
St.eele, Utah 184 Pac. (2d) 216, 219. The full limits of 
the railroad claim, could, of course, have been clearly 
set forth for all to see if the railroad had decided to 
place them of record. In the absence of such a precau-
tion the notice given by acts of possession must be viewed 
restrictively. 
It is, therefore, submitted that the Trial Court erred 
in finding that the pole lines, guy wires, and trolley wires 
of the railroad gave constructive notice of a fee interest 
in the land in question. 
POINT III 
CERTAIN FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
A. ·The Decree covers land not under litigation. 
The Trial Court has decreed that plaintiff is owner 
of a strip of property .899.2·5 feet by 330 feet (Decree, 
par 1). 'This description would include land which is not 
now and never has been owned or claimed by Defendants, 
whose claimed interest is a strip only 200 feet in length. 
The description in the decree should be restricted to the 
title of the property claimed by defendants. 
B. There is no probative evidence that Plaintiff 
paid taxes over the property. 
The Trial Court found that the taxes on the dis-
puted property were paid by the railroad. It is submitted 
that the sole evidence as to the payment of taxes by 
the railroad was that taxes were paid over the "right-
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of-way" of plaintiffs, such ''right-of-way" not being des-
cribed as to width. Whether the particular land in dis-
pute is part of such "right-of-way" is the general ques-
tion under litigation. Therefore, such evidence has no 
value and such finding is not justified. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit, accordingly, that under the uncontra-
dicted facts of this case, the lower court did err in find-
ing that: 
(1) the recitations in the 1909 deeds could reason-
ably give constructive record to defendants of the Decree 
of 1897. 
('2) the physical acts of plaintiff with regard to 
such land gave defendants constructive notice to defend-
ants of the Decree of 1897. 
·( 3) the findings and decree of the court cover more 
property than that actually claimed by defendants and 
by reciting payments of taxes by plaintiff which are 
unsupported by the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Albert J'. Colton of 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & MABEY 
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